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                                                           INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In March 1990, the Department of Sociology invited Professor Morgan to deliver a 
seminar to its postgraduate students on the Masters' course in Criminology, and a 
public lecture on developments in police policy and policing in England and Wales. 
Professor Morgan's visit was the first in a new programme of visitors to the 
Department. The purpose of the programme is to bring eminent scholars in various 
fields of sociology and public policy to Hong Kong, and thereby to contribute - 
sometimes directly, sometimes by means of comparative materials - to debates on 
issues of interest in Hong Kong. The paper which follows is the text of Professor 
Morgan's public lecture.  
 
Rod Morgan is Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Bristol, UK. In 
addition to extensive writings on prisons and criminal justice policy, he has recently 
published Coming to Terms With Policing, co-edited with David J. Smith (London, 
Routledge, 1989), and his study of police-community consultation procedures in 
England and Wales will be published shortly. 
 
His lecture reflects his recent concerns with policing. In the last 10 or so years, 
policing in England and Wales has become a highly controversial matter. He refers in 
his opening pages to the inner-city riots of 1981, which have come to be understood 
specifically as anti-police riots; to accusations of political bias in the way that strikes 
and demonstrations have been policed; to alleged police malpractices which may 
have resulted in the wrongful convictions of the 'Guildford Four' and the 'Birmingham 
Six' (both cases involved alleged Irish Republican Army bombers; shortly before this 
occasional paper went to press, convictions against all those imprisoned for these 
bombings were quashed); and to the 'Stalker Affair', in which the investigation of an 
alleged secret 'shoot to kill' policy in Northern Ireland, against Irish Republican Army 
members, was widely believed to have been 'spiked', either by police or by 
government officials, by claims of corruption - later determined to be unfounded - 
against the head of the investigation, John Stalker. 
 
All this may seem to be rather far from the concerns of Hong Kong. Yet, as Professor 
Morgan argues, there are some general issues underlying the English experience. 
Questions of police powers, of police funding and its effects on police effectiveness, 
of the viability of some forms of community policing, of the politicization of policing 
in a society characterized by party politics, as Britain is and as Hong Kong very likely 
will be in the near future - these questions, and Professor Morgan's views on them, 
pertain not just to one or two societies, but speak to fundamental concerns about the 
nature of policing in all societies. In the Hong Kong context, where issues such as 
government, policing, and citizens' rights are now high on the agenda for change, 
Professor Morgan's paper provides timely food for thought. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Jon Vagg and Thomas Wong 
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POLICING BY CONSENT: 
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE OLD PROBLEM  
OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Rod Morgan 
 
 
 
Crisis is a word much over-used in relation to social policy. A crisis is a momentous 
turning point, an imminent breakdown. The description is seldom apt. The fact that 
alleged crises persist, that they appear, according to some observers, to be 
permanently with us, is almost certainly a contradiction in terms. In fact crisis is a 
word too often employed rhetorically: seldom an accurate description, more 
frequently a wish hoping ardently to be fulfilled. 
 
These opening thoughts are prompted by the debate about policing in the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s. In the early part of the decade the inner city riots, many 
of them quite explicitly directed against the police, led to the use of the word crisis: 
the disorders allegedly represented a breakdown in relationships between the young, 
particularly black youth, and the police in the inner cities. In the middle of the 
decade, a series of industrial disputes, notably the 1984-5 national miners' strike, 
were said to be symptomatic of a crisis in policing: critics argued that the police were 
being drawn into political disputes to a degree which dangerously undermined their 
impartiality. In the late 1980s the country has been wracked by a series of police 
scandals which continue. Indeed not a week now goes by without some addition to 
these sagas. Some examples: the alleged 'shoot to kill' policy in Northern Ireland and 
its investigation, culminating in the Stalker Affair (though a thousand miles away, 
and involving a special military unit rather than the police, the shooting dead of three 
IRA bombers in Gibraltar in 1988 provided a vivid epilogue to this allegation); police 
malpractice leading to the release of the 'Guildford Four' in 1989, after they had 
served 16 years of life sentences for the wrongful conviction of an IRA bombing (it 
seems likely that there will be a similar outcome for the 'Birmingham Six', and for 
much the same reasons, within the foreseeable future); and the disbanding of the 
Serious Crime Squad in the West Midlands because of officers' alleged systematic 
fabrication of evidence and use of oppressive methods, amounting possibly to torture, 
to extract confessions. 
 
Several official inquiries into these last matters are ongoing and judgements about 
them must properly be reserved. However, it is already clear that there has been a 
good deal of police malpractice and the consequence is said by some to amount to a 
crisis of confidence in the police: a loss of trust. This loss of trust is not only among 
those sections of the community traditionally suspicious of the police. For example, it 
is clear that police evidence is now less often believed and accepted by juries and 
judges (Feldman, forthcoming; Leonard 1990). Once again, therefore, there is talk of 
a crisis in policing, one possible sign of which was the publication in March of this 
year of a 350 page Operational Policing Review, jointly planned, carried out and 
published by the three police staff associations of England and Wales, an 
unprecedented collaboration prompted by a perceived need to defend and promote the 
police service (ACPO 1990). 
 
I doubt, for the reasons I have given, that we can reasonably talk of a crisis in 
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policing. There is no sign of imminent breakdown. No momentous turning point 
seems in prospect. On the contrary, the ills which most commentators have identified 
are longstanding. For example, many of the malpractices which have come to light in 
recent scandals happened almost 20 years ago. Further, the grievances which released 
pent-up hostilities in the inner cities in the early 1980s were the product of 
experiences over many years. Moreover, many of the remedies canvassed for these 
ills are based on past practices and those that are not tend, incrementally, to build on 
existing constitutional, legal and procedural structures. There is not so much a crisis 
so much as a creeping malaise or doubt. But it is no less serious for that. Indeed, it 
may be more serious. A genuine crisis galvanizes politicians and administrators to 
act. A creeping malaise steals up on people. The symptoms may be perceived as 
marginal, exceptional: like the signs of aging they may be noticed only vaguely. It is 
for this reason that it seems sensible to try and reassess some old policing concepts 
and see where we get with them. I have in mind two, the doctrine of policing by 
consent, a doctrine much beloved by the British though not, perhaps, by anyone else, 
and police accountability. 
 
 
 
Policing by consent 
 
Let us begin with a phrase of which we in Britain are inordinately fond. We are wont, 
or at least our chief officers of police and politicians are wont, to say that we have a 
tradition of 'policing by consent'. 
 
Let me begin with two, perhaps obvious, disavowals about the idea of policing by 
consent. There never can or should be complete policing by consent in two 
fundamental senses. Action by the police cannot depend on the assent of offenders, 
nor should the wishes of victims be paramount. The opinions of victims, either 
individuals or groups, are important but they cannot ultimately be allowed to 
determine police decisions. Policing is a public good. Offences are committed not 
merely against individuals but against the Queen's peace - that is to say the 
community's peace. It was to remove law enforcement from the individual or private 
domain that the state police were created. Police decisions must be public policy 
decisions. That does not mean that policy decisions must be delegated exclusively to 
the police - indeed I shall argue the contrary - but they should not be dependent on 
the wishes of individuals or sectional interests. 
 
I want to consider the idea of consent under four headings: constitutional, legal, 
attitudinal and operational. I propose taking the headings in reverse order so that we 
can consider policing from the grass roots up. 
 
 
 
Operational consent 
 
In a sense we can read consent from the way the police police. Indeed in Britain we 
have prided ourselves on the fact. The lone police constable, patrolling on foot, 
unarmed, quaintly and familiarly uniformed in essentially 19th century garb, chatting 
to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood with which he is a part, being asked the way 
or the time - and we know from our Home Office crime surveys that this really is how 
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most people in the UK have contact with the police (Southgate and Ekblom 1984) - is 
the very epitome of consent operationalized in day to day policing. This traditional 
benign picture has been gravely disturbed by developments during the last fifteen 
years, however. There is now a new set of policing images. They involve groups of 
officers spilling from steel-enmeshed Transit vans, clad in NATO helmets and flame-
proof suits - suits, incidentally, too often lacking individual identification numbers - 
wielding batons and formed up in ranks behind long shields. Indeed, when we come 
to look back on the 1980s, the chances are that we shall recall it as a litany of 
incidents when the police, resorting increasingly to paramilitary methods, methods 
previously considered foreign to our culture, did battle with striking workers, 
protesters, young blacks or alienated urban youth. 
 
We must not overstate this transition. Most of us have personally not witnessed the 
new policing: we know it only from our television screens. The patrolling lone police 
officer continues. Indeed, if chief constables' annual reports are to be believed, he is 
enjoying a resurgence. More officers are said now to be deployed on community 
beats. However, seldom do they live in or even near the areas they patrol, particularly 
the poorer disadvantaged neighbourhoods where the new equipment is most likely to 
be brought into play. They are increasingly outsiders. Further, these same community 
officers are trained in the new public order policing. When the tension indicators are 
said to be running high, it is the community beat officer, rather than the mobile patrol 
and the station officer, who is most likely to be abstracted to sit waiting in the back of 
a Transit van (Brown and Isles 1985). Their batons, shields, CS gas and plastic 
bullets are ready. Traditional policing remains, but it now fronts new operational 
policies which had they been predicted 20 years ago would have been described as 
unthinkable. These changes do not symbolize consent: indeed the public order tactics 
of today are the antithesis of those advocated officially as recently as 10 years ago 
(Home Office 1980). 
 
 
 
Attitudinal consent 
 
The last Royal Commission on the Police in the UK was conducted in 1962. It 
reported, on the basis of survey evidence, that 83 per cent of the public thought the 
British police the best in the world (Cmnd 1728, 1962). Half the respondents, 
disingenuously you may think, thought it inconceivable that any police officer would 
accept a bribe. It is not easy to plot changing public opinions, not least because the 
way the questions are asked changes. Nevertheless there is firm survey evidence that 
the general level of public confidence in the police has diminished (Jowell and Topf 
1988, Mayhew et al. 1989). It would be quite wrong to suggest that there is a critical 
loss of public confidence in the police. There is not. On the contrary, repeated 
opinion poll evidence indicates that the police remain among our most trusted public 
institutions. Nevertheless, in addition to the general decline in confidence there is 
evidence from local and more focused surveys that in some areas sizeable proportions 
of the population now believe that the police sometimes or often use undue force 
when arresting people, are violent to prisoners in police stations, and plant evidence 
or take bribes (Smith and Gray 1985, Jones et al. 1986). Moreover many people 
believe that the police are now more likely to behave in this manner than in the past. 
What is particularly worrying is that those who have most contact with the police - 
the young, the unemployed and the ethnic minorities - are most likely to believe that 
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the police are not to be trusted. Further, the results of the third Home Office British 
Crime survey suggests that the proportion of people not reporting offences to the 
police either because 'they could not have done anything' or 'because they would not 
have been bothered or interested' is increasing, as is the proportion of people who did 
report offences to the police and who were dissatisfied with their response (Mayhew 
et al. 1989). 
 
In one sense this is scarcely surprising. Those who have the most adversarial contact 
with the police are likely to resent the fact. Equally, however, we would be wise not 
to set too much store in the confidence which the majority of the population, having 
little or no familiarity with the police, express. To ask them what they think of the 
police is probably little more than a test in patriotism. Not to believe that the police 
are honest, fair or professional is tantamount to believing that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with the body politic. It is not a view lightly held. We would be 
wise, therefore, to pay attention to the pockets of discontent and they are not 
inconsiderable. There is a significant degree of expressed lack of consent. 
 
 
 
Legal consent 
 
The police operate within a framework of law. Indeed it is often said that the police 
are primarily accountable to the law. The doctrine was emphatically expressed in 
Lord Denning's oft-quoted judgement that a chief constable is 'not the servant of 
anyone, save of the law itself' (R. v. MCP, ex p. Blackburn, [1968] 2 QB 118). The 
laws the police enforce and the powers with which they are invested have been 
passed by a democratically elected Parliament. In that sense they may be said to 
express the will of the people, to be the embodiment of our consent. 
 
This legal doctrine of consent has of course always been suspect. Democracies are 
imperfect. The law changes slowly. Parliament may be elected only once in every few 
years. And in Britain at least, rarely do political parties incorporate in their 
manifestoes undertakings to introduce or repeal specific criminal laws or police 
powers. Nevertheless the idea of legal consent was always given substance in the UK 
by the fact that police powers traditionally received a high level of bipartisan party 
political support. That has changed in the last decade. In England and Wales the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which comprehensively revised police 
powers of stop and search, entry, search and seizure, arrest, detention and the 
questioning and treatment of suspects, was arguably the most controversial piece of 
legislation introduced during the present Government's first and second term. Critics 
argued that the Act greatly increased police powers which they hypothesized would 
further be used to oppress vulnerable minorities. During the passage of the Bill the 
Labour Party undertook to repeal it. Police powers became highly controversial. 
 
Moreover, analyses of the way existing police powers were being used, including 
some of the studies conducted by the Home Office's own Research and Planning Unit 
(Willis 1983), shed conceptual doubt on the doctrine of legal accountability. Fuelled 
by misgivings about broader changes in policing policy - particularly those stop and 
search tactics which appeared to have precipitated the inner city riots in London and 
elsewhere in 1981 - politicians began to maintain something which sociologists of the 
police had never doubted, namely that the law determines policing policy to only a 
5 
POLICING BY CONSENT 
very limited extent. The law is silent on crucial aspects of policing. It does not tell the 
police what priorities to pursue nor which of their many powers to select. Many 
police managerial decisions - how to allocate resources and which methods to use - 
are as much political as legal decisions. Further, many of the decisions of constables 
on the beat owe as much to moral as legal judgement. The law is a resource to which 
the police may choose to resort. Both the doctrine of legal accountability and the idea 
of the law as the embodiment of consent became more widely questioned. 
 
 
 
Constitutional consent 
 
These operational, attitudinal and legal arguments have spilled over into the 
constitutional domain. Consent within the arrangements for the governance of the 
police began to break down in the early 1980s. 
 
In the UK we have no national police force. In England and Wales we have 43 
separate police forces tied to local government. Scotland and Northern Ireland have 
their own local police forces. Governing all of these forces is what is often referred to 
as the tripartite structure for the governance of the police. The prevailing statute, the 
Police Act 1964, specifies three parties to the arrangement. Chief constables are 
responsible for the 'direction and control' of their forces (s.5(1)). Police authorities, 
local committees comprising two thirds elected councillors and one third appointed 
magistrates chosen by their peers, are responsible for the 'adequacy and efficiency' of 
forces (s.4(i)). And the Secretary of State, the Home Secretary, has a formidable array 
of powers over all forces which he must exercise so as 'to promote the efficiency of 
the police' (s.28). Finally, responsibility for the police budget is shared: 51 per cent of 
police spending comes from central government in the form of a specific police grant 
and 49 per cent is provided by local government (though approximately half of this is 
met by central government from a general grant). 
 
This arrangement has always been recognized as a masterpiece of ambiguity 
(Marshall 1965). The fact that power is shared, that influence can be brought to bear 
on policing policy through the delicate mystery of the arrangement, is said to be its 
peculiarly British strength. But the key terms used in the legislation - adequacy, 
efficiency, direction and control - have never been defined, and one phrase much used 
in British policing circles - operational policy - does not even appear in the statute 
(Lustgarten 1986, Oliver 1987). Until the late 1970s these ambiguities seem not 
greatly to have mattered. The parties to the tripartite arrangement jointly consented to 
make the mystery work. Because policing policy was largely uncontroversial the 
ambiguities in the legislation were not exposed. All that changed in the early 1980s. 
Police authority meetings, formerly quiet municipal backwaters where faithful old 
councillors were put out to grass, became fiercely contested arenas within which 
dissensus was conspicuously demonstrated (Morgan and Swift 1987). In several 
metropolitan centres, chief constables were locked in public combat with the 
chairpersons of their police authorities. During the 1984-5 miners' strike the fragility 
of the constitutional structure was fully exposed. Councillors of all political 
persuasions, previously reliant on the proposition that their hands on the purse strings 
enabled them to steer policy, were rudely made aware of the fact that the Home 
Secretary had given the police a blank cheque behind their backs (Spencer 1985). 
There began to be talk of the need for a new Royal Commission on the Police (SDP 
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1985). 
 
 
 
 
 
The politics of policing and police accountability 
 
The result of the strains of the late 1970s and early 1980s, strains that were to a 
substantial extent the product of the deepening social and economic divides which 
accompanied fundamental restructuring of the economy, was that policing policy 
became politicized to an unprecedented degree (Morgan and Smith 1989). 
 
The Conservative Party made 'law and order' a key plank in their 1979 electoral 
victory. One of their 'five tasks' was restoring the 'rule of law'. Prominent among the 
methods they adopted was spending 'more on fighting crime even while we 
economise elsewhere' (Conservative Party 1979: 19). More police were to be 
recruited and they were to be better paid. Ten years later, delivered as promised, this 
spending has become the Government's proud boast (Home Office 1986). Spending 
on the police has risen substantially in real terms, as has the number of officers and 
civilians employed. 
 
Yet recorded crime has also continued to rise inexorably (though almost certainly 
faster than the incidence of offences - see Mayhew et al. 1989) and the clear up rate 
has fallen. Unsurprisingly the Labour Party has taunted the Government with failure: 
the Government stands accused of having promoted a crime wave and of having 
conspicuously failed to protect the public (Labour Party 1986). Further, Lord 
Scarman's diagnosis, contained in his seminal report on the 1981 inner city riots - that 
the police are in danger of becoming 'a 'corps d'elite', out of touch with the 
community' (Scarman 1981) - has led critics to argue for legal and constitutional 
reforms. If the police are developing counter-productive policies inimical to the 
British tradition - policies which because of the constitutional framework have been 
neither debated nor determined at either Westminster or in police authority forums - 
then it was time for these essentially political decisions to be made by politicians 
(Spencer 1985a, Lustgarten 1986). The Labour Party committed itself to revising the 
Police Act. They promised to empower police authorities to determine issues of 
general as opposed to day to day policy. The Party also undertook to remove 
unelected and thus unaccountable magistrates from police committees: henceforth the 
police 'like any other public service' must allow 'members of the local community ... 
through their elected representatives ... to have a say in how policing is run' (Labour 
Party 1987). The Labour Party also argued, at the time that the Bill was passing 
through Parliament, that they would repeal large sections of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, the centrepiece of the Government's legislative programme on 
police powers. 
 
In fact there is evidence that these heated party political divides over policing are 
being cooled and narrowed. Beneath the rhetoric there is emerging evidence of a new 
consensus. To understand what it comprises we need briefly to consider some of the 
initiatives in policing policy which have emerged during the 1980s and which will 
almost certainly underpin the shape of things well into the 1990s. 
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The 1980s Government programme and the accountability debate 
 
The Government has made it clear that it does not intend to tamper with the tripartite 
arrangements for the governance of the police. It is wedded to what I think is best 
described as the stewardship model for police accountability (Morgan 1985), what 
one writer has termed the 'explanatory mode' (Marshall 1965). The police are the 
professionals: they have delegated to them certain powers and decisions for the use of 
which they have a duty to account ex post facto. This model stands contrasted with 
the 'directive mode', the accountability of a servant to a master, which the Labour 
Party with its plan to empower police authorities favours. Yet the Government has 
not been complacent about Lord Scarman's jibe about the police becoming a corps 
d'elite out of touch with the community. They have introduced various measures to 
beef up the stewardship model, to make the stewardship more transparent and, insofar 
as chief constables have fallen out with their police authorities, to push them back 
into bed together. The current buzzword is partnership between the police and public. 
What is the framework for this partnership? 
 
The ingredients appear to be based on the proposition that any meaningful framework 
for accountability must link the mechanisms for constitutional accountability to legal, 
political, managerial and procedural accountability devices. To be accountable to 
someone one has to be accountable for something. There has to be greater 
determinacy about what service one is delivering, politicians have to be provided 
with firmer measures of performance, managers have to know what their subordinates 
are doing and members of the public - users of the police or persons used by the 
police (depending on whether contact is adversarial or not) - have to receive better 
feedback about what is being done for them or against them. If there is to be genuine 
accountability we have to be concerned not merely with the constitutional framework 
for the governance of the police: we have also to concern ourselves with a chain of 
interlocking vertical relationships within the police organization and, at different 
horizontal levels in the organisation, to outsiders. What are the ingredients in the 
Government programme for greater stewardship and partnership in policing, and do 
they satisfy the demands of the accountability model I have sketched? 
 
First, there is the proposition that citizens have rights which the police, their powers 
and procedures must respect. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) 
confers rights which the police have a duty to safeguard: for example, the suspect's 
right to legal advice when detained. Further, the police are now obliged to justify, 
explain, record, and, in some cases, subsequently to publish their decisions. Persons 
stopped and searched on the street are entitled to be told why the police have stopped 
them and thereafter to be given a document recording the details of the incident and 
decision. Persons detained in a police station must have every aspect of their custody 
entered on a custody record, a copy of which they may subsequently receive. I do not 
say that all these statutory provisions are working as Parliament intended. Nor am I 
suggesting that the use made of police powers has been transformed by the new 
legislation. Nevertheless, the statute has in some respects successfully provided for 
greater openness. There can be little doubt that some - not all - but some of the 
scandalous police malpractices which have come to light in recent months are now 
less likely to occur because of PACE. 
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Second, PACE s.106 stipulates that 'arrangements shall be made in each police area 
for obtaining the views of people in each police area about matters concerning the 
policing of the area and for obtaining their cooperation with the police in preventing 
crime'. Though the statute does not provide a blueprint as to how this shall be done, 
when, about what and with whom, practically every police force in England and 
Wales has followed Home Office advice (issued in the form of circulars) and set up 
formal police community consultative committees (PCCs), usually by police sub-
division (Morgan 1985, Morgan and Swift, in preparation). PCCs are by no means 
without their problems. Their membership is disproportionately male, middle-aged 
and middle class. In the inner city areas where Lord Scarman implicitly suggested 
that they were most needed, the ethnic minorities are often conspicuous by their 
absence. Nevertheless PCCs have become the proving ground on which police middle 
managers are learning to listen to public views as to what local problems comprise 
and what police priorities should be. Through PCCs, the police are getting used to 
discussing more openly the real dilemmas that confront them. And this grassroots 
experience is being fed back into police authority debates: PCCs are typically chaired 
by county councillor members of police authorities.  
 
Third, in 1982/3 the Home Office took up another of Lord Scarman's 
recommendations. 'Lay visitor to police station' schemes were introduced 
experimentally in six police forces in England and Wales. In 1986 the idea was 
commended generally by means of a Home Office circular and today all but five of 
the 43 police forces in England and Wales are operating lay visitor schemes in either 
part or all of their force areas (Kemp and Morgan 1990). Lay visitors have no 
statutory basis. They are groups of people who periodically inspect the conditions in 
which prisoners are held in police stations and who are able to check whether the 
procedures for detention laid down by PACE are being complied with. They have 
been introduced with a view to increasing public confidence in the police. However, 
even where confidence in what happens in police stations locally stands high, lay 
visitors potentially provide an additional safeguard for the rights of prisoners. They 
typically feed their findings to either the PCCs or police authorities or both. And, as 
with PCCs, a high proportion of them are county and district councillors. Like 
consultation arrangements, many lay visiting schemes can quite reasonably be 
criticized for being ritualistic, half-hearted and ineffective. Nevertheless, lay visiting 
has opened up to public scrutiny a hitherto largely secret police world and in some 
areas, notably Merseyside and London, where in the past some notably suspicious 
deaths in police custody excited a good deal of public anxiety and anger, lay visitors 
have developed vigorous professionalism. In London, it is worth noting, more than a 
third of the visitors are drawn from the ethnic minorities. 
 
Fourth, as a result of the application to the police of the Government's Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI, designed to enhance the accountability of all public 
sector services) there is now a vogue for 'policing by objectives' (PBO), force 'audits', 
'priority' or 'strategic' statements (ACPO 1990: Section Two). The aim is that the 
police, like other public services, should define their objectives and priorities more 
precisely, develop techniques for measuring the degree to which objectives have been 
attained and devolve to each level of decision-making the capacity to determine the 
allocation of resources so that objectives can be better pursued. There are a host of 
problems associated with PBO and a good deal of scepticism as to whether the 
management method is appropriate to policing or leading to any discernible 
difference to what officers do on the ground. Nonetheless, what the vogue for PBO 
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has stimulated is a debate, a debate more and more conducted in public as well as in-
house, as to what policing is designed to achieve and what policing priorities ought to 
be. It is significant, therefore, that the recent Operational Policing Review conducted 
by the police staff associations included a large public opinion survey which focused 
on what the public thought policing priorities ought to be, whether existing policing 
resources were being used in an appropriate manner and what use should be made of 
additional policing resources were they provided (ACPO 1990: Section Five). These 
are not questions on which the police have traditionally invited public participation: 
on the contrary, these are operational issues about which they have jealously guarded 
their independence, matters best left to the professionals. PBO may not significantly 
have altered what the police do on the ground, but it has helped to open up public 
discussion as to what they should be doing on the ground. 
 
Fifth, and closely linked with the last development, has been the substantial effort put 
into involving the public in policing and crime prevention. There is a significant 
change of tone in the Governments' statements on 'law and order' since it took office 
in 1979. For example, though the promise to spend more on 'fighting crime' of the 
1979 Conservative Manifesto was followed by the proud boast that this is exactly 
what the Government had achieved (Home Office 1986), much had changed by the 
general election of 1987. The Government stood by its 'law and order' guns but no 
longer 'underrated the challenge'. It pointed out almost defensively that 'crime has 
been rising steadily over the years: not just in Britain but in most other countries, too. 
The origins of crime lie deep in society' (Conservative Party 1987: 55). The emphasis 
now was a policing partnership with the public, 'encouraging local communities to 
prevent crime and to help the police detect it'. Voluntary policing effort became part 
of the Government's advocacy of 'positive citizenship'. 
 
The manifestation has been the explosion during the 1980s of: schemes for 
'neighbourhood watch', 'pubwatch', 'shopwatch', etc.; the creation of 'crime-stopper' 
programmes, police hotlines over which targeted community groups are encouraged 
to give information about their fellow citizens to the police; attempts to rejuvenate 
crime prevention panels; and the revival of interest in special constabularies of 
volunteer unpaid police officers. Further, the voluntarization of policing has run 
parallel to the continued substantial growth of privatized policing in the form of the 
commercial security industry. The available sophisticated research evidence (Bennett 
1990) suggests that neighbourhood watch, to take the most fashionable and 
numerically most important of these developments, is not particularly effective in 
reducing or clearing up crime. However, the evidence from such short-run technical 
evaluations may not be the point. The police see value in voluntarization in terms of 
grass-roots police community contact and the agency the Government has created to 
foster these developments, 'Crime Concern', tends increasingly to argue for 
neighbourhood watch and similar initiatives for their 'community developmental' 
potential (Whiskin 1989). 
 
Sixth, and finally, there has been the continued emphasis on 'community policing'. 
Community policing is the buzzword of the decade: it means all things to all men 
(Weatheritt 1986, Skolnick and Bayley 1988, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). 
Yet insofar as the idea has at its core the concept of the neighbourhood officer, often 
patrolling on foot, with high continuity of contact with a small beat, expected to get 
to know people and institutions locally and deal with the bulk of the policing business 
generated on his patch, then most chief constables in Britain claim to be committed to 
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community policing and to be devoting more of their officers to it. I know of no 
systematic evidence for the UK to substantiate these claims and I am not yet 
convinced that an increased proportion of police manpower is now devoted to some 
semblance of community policing. Indeed there are good grounds for scepticism, not 
least because we know that neighbourhood beat officers are often not on their beats 
(Brown and Isles 1985, Morgan and Swift forthcoming). Nevertheless it is not 
difficult to see why chief constables make the claims. The public like to see familiar 
officers patrolling their neighbourhood and would like a greater proportion of officers 
to be devoted to the task (ACPO 1990: Sections Four and Five). Further, we know 
that most policing is effectively done by members of the community for themselves 
(Shapland and Vagg 1988) so it makes sense for the police to tune into the local 
network and work with the grain of what the public do for themselves. Moreover, 
insofar as community officers do this, it suggests that there may be a degree of day-
to-day operational accountability between the police and the public at grass-roots 
level. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
During the 1980s the debate about police accountability in the UK has to a large 
extent been relocated. The profound changes in policing that followed the inner city 
disorders at the beginning of the decade, changes which critics argued were inimical 
to the British policing tradition and which had been fully debated or approved by 
neither elected politicians in Parliament or local government, precipitated a critique 
of the consitutional arrangements for the governance of the police and the legal 
framework within which the police operate. The Government resisted that pressure: 
the tripartite constitutional structure, and police independence to determine 
operational policy, were preserved, though the legal powers which the police have 
were systematically revised by PACE. Critics argued that police powers were greatly 
increased and they predicted that the rights and liberties of citizens, particularly those 
of vulnerable minority groups, would be trampled. By contrast the police argued that 
the safeguards which, according to the Government, were built into PACE were 
onerous, would tie the police down with paperwork and make it more difficult to 
bring offenders to book. 
 
However, the Government was not complacent in the face of the constitutional 
critique. They bolstered what I have called the stewardship doctrine of professional 
accountability: the police, the professionals, would in future be required to exercise 
their stewardship more transparently for the laity; they would have to enter into 
dialogues with the people at all levels, consult about objectives and priorities, explain 
their actions more fully and account for their decisions more to those people on the 
receiving end of their decisions. The mechanisms introduced to mediate these 
messages - consultative groups, lay visiting schemes, crime prevention committees of 
various kinds, inter-agency liaison groups, etc. - brought local politicians, officers 
from other statutory agencies and community leaders into more and more direct 
contact with the police. As a consequence it became part of the stock in trade of 
police middle managers to reveal more of their policing dilemmas to outsiders. The 
traditional enclave of policing was opened up. 
 
This pattern of participation has led to the transformation of police authority 
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deliberations. Chief constables seldom now stand upon the dignity of operational 
independence when asked for accounts about policing policy and decisions: they 
show more of their hand. As a result councillors are now better informed about the 
realities of day to day policing and are generally less likely to strike irresponsible 
postures about it. At one extreme there are now fewer councillors who judge it to be 
impertinent to ask the police penetrating questions about policy. At the other extreme 
there are also fewer councillors who never fail to take an opportunity to embarrass the 
police or publicly attack them. The days of such posturing at both ends of the political 
spectrum appear to be passing. Participants in these local political forums tend to be 
become more sympathetic to police viewpoints. As a consequence the demand for 
constitutional reform is waning and it now seems less likely that the Labour Party 
will radically revise the Police Act 1964 if returned to office. It is significant that 
even in the face of the scandals about police malpractice which have emerged during 
the past year there has been no widespread resurgence of the calls for radical reform 
of the constitutional framework nor reduction of police powers. Legal changes have 
been mooted but they have concerned the need to prevent persons being convicted on 
the basis of uncorroborated confessional evidence and provide a more effective 
appeal mechanism to investigate possibly wrongful convictions. 
 
The police debate has shifted rather to questions of police managerial accountability, 
the related issues of discipline and complaints and day-to-day operational priorities, 
feedback and contact with users of police services: in effect questions of procedural 
accountability at the point of service delivery. This cluster of issues includes 
everything from the continuing attempt to measure what the police do to providing a 
more coherent role specification for community officers, setting neighbourhood 
problem-solving priorities, and providing better information for users about what has 
happened to their reported offences and what, if anything, the police investigation has 
turned up. While the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers takes 
a more and more centralized control over the general shape of policing policy - to the 
extent that the police service in England and Wales is now more a national service 
locally administered than a constitutionally devolved service accountable locally - 
operational policing practice is locally the subject of more participative discussion by 
local elites. The only major structural accountability reform still firmly on the 
national political agenda is the system for investigating complaints against the police. 
In the wake of the recent scandals it seems only a matter of time before an entirely 
independent investigative agency is created to look into serious complaints against 
the police. At present serving police officers continue to investigate police officers, 
albeit overseen by the Police Complaints Authority. 
 
This relocation of the accountability debate has, in my own judgement, had some 
effects about which I have considerable misgivings. For example, the police have 
skillfully persuaded local political elites of all shades of political opinion that they 
should be given further substantial resources. The professionals have co-opted the 
laity to their viewpoint. This has produced a dilemma for the Government because it 
is doubtful that the demand for further police resources would, if met, contribute to 
more effective policing. We know from a substantial body of research conducted both 
in this country and North America that providing more police officers has neither an 
equivalent crime preventive or crime solving effect (Clarke and Hough 1980, 1984). 
Indeed confidence in traditional police methods has been undermined by the results 
from a series of studies. Changes in the level of patrol, for example, appear to have no 
great effect on the level of crime or disorder (Morris and Heal 1981). Improving 
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police response time has no discernible effect on the likelihood of arresting criminals 
(Bieck and Kessler 1977). Detective work is seldom effective in finding unknown 
offenders (Greenwood and Petersilia 1976). 
 
There may be quite legitimate reasons for increasing police resources: it might make 
us feel safer; it might reduce stress among police officers; it might enable them to 
spend more time on training; or it might permit the police more carefully to attend to 
the needs of victims. But all the evidence suggests it would not of itself reduce the 
incidence of crime. Crime, insofar as we can predict it at all, is better predicted by 
social conditions - income distribution, unemployment, demographic trends, social 
heterogeneity, etc - than it is by spending on police officers (Morris and Heal 1981). 
The Government - any government - would therefore be wise to pause before 
acceding to further demands, however well supported locally, for further resources 
from a service which has already enjoyed greater immunity from government 
spending restrictions than any other public service since 1979. 
 
 
 
Postscript 
 
How should the Government respond then to the undoubted public demand for 
additional police officers which they have done so much to stoke up? Let me 
conclude with some notes for policies in the 1990s. I think we face at least three 
dilemmas to which I do not have easy solutions and which will require careful 
thought in the coming decade. 
 
First, there is the question of where the boundary between state, voluntary, and 
private policing should lie. That boundary is fixed in part by market forces. But it is 
also influenced by government policy and that, in turn, is determined by fiscal 
considerations. I doubt that the private security sector should continue unregulated: 
the services it provides are now so extensive and important that there is almost 
certainly a need for registration and inspection. Equally, we have to ask the question 
as to whether all the tasks undertaken by the police have to be performed by 
constables as skilled and trained and thus expensive as they now are. The 
civilianization of police posts can be extended. But we have to ask whether there is a 
case for making more extensive and effective use of volunteers. Should we, for 
example, pay special constables a retainer on the lines of the territorial army? Or, 
more radically still, should we consider introducing community or neighbourhood 
equivalents of traffic wardens to undertake generalized local patrols? 
 
Second, there remains, despite everything I have said, a question mark over the issue 
of police constitutional accountability. Most people are opposed to policing being 
drawn further into the party political arena. However, the politicization of policing in 
the 1980s owed much to the ambiguities in the arrangements for the governance of 
the police. It permitted politicians, on both the right and left of the political spectrum, 
to be irresponsible about policing policy because they were not responsible 
constitutionally. And all this at a time when it became more and more clear that 
fundamental changes were taking place in the nature of policing without those 
changes being subject to proper democratic debate at either local or central 
government level. It seems to me that despite the calmer waters into which we have 
moved that nettle has still to be grasped. Since, arguably, we now have a national 
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police force in all but name we have eventually to create a constitutional structure 
congruent with the realities of modern policing. 
 
My own view is that sensitivity to local needs will best be preserved through the 
maintenance of local police forces. But those forces should be genuinely local with 
the local authorities able to determine, on the advice of their chief officers, the level 
and shape of local policing policy. However, I think there is also a case for creating a 
genuinely national police force answerable to Parliament via the Home Secretary. 
Such a force should provide the national functions - protection of the Royal Family, 
Parliament and the diplomatic corps as well as providing specialist services to local 
forces and undertaking international liaison - many of which are currently catered for 
by the Metropolitan Police. There is a clear need to make the Met a genuinely local 
force accountable, as are the provincial forces, to a democratically elected police 
authority. The Met's national functions have always been given as a reason for not 
pursuing this policy: those national functions should be hived off (for an expanded 
exposition of this viewpoint see Morgan 1990). 
 
Third, the accountability debate ties in closely with the pressure for, on the one hand, 
increasingly specialized headquarters, regional or national squads - to combat serious 
international drug trafficking, for example - and, on the other hand, the arguments for 
so-called community policing: more uniformed officers assigned to neighbourhood 
beats and more continuity in their attachments. This is a real dilemma. But I do not 
believe that the solutions are necessarily incompatible. There may well be a case for 
more specialized squads to combat serious professional crime. However, the vast 
majority of crime lacks those characteristics. Most crime is amateurish and parochial. 
The peak age for offending is 15 years and most offences are committed close to 
offenders' homes. Effective grass roots policing needs to comprise team policing - 
detectives and unformed officers - attached to relatively small areas, usually parts of 
sub-divisions. That objective requires greater application of the Government's 
Financial Management Initiative to policing than has yet occurred. It should mean 
devolving more powers to police middle managers to determine the manner in which 
they use their resources and, in partnership with the local community, setting 
objectives and measuring their attainment at sub-divisional level. It involves greater 
operational accountability locally: if that partnership between the police and the local 
community does not exists there will be no 'policing by consent' worthy of the name. 
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